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1. Introduction
Onshore transmission pipelines are one of the common ways, in Europe as in other parts of
the world, to transport large amounts of hazardous goods through great distances. They are
also the safest way, according to statistics (cf table 1).
Table 1: Accident rate in hazardous goods transportation (France, 1998-2003)
Transportation by
Number of accident /106 tons.year
Road
0,7
Rail
0,41
Sea
0,19
River
0,13
Pipeline
0,02
Despite of this low failure rate, thèse pipelines may generate major accidents, as shown by
the following pictures.
Jet fire on a gas pipeline Leak on a crude oil pipeline
(Ghislenghien, Belgium, 2004) (Saint-Martin-de-Crau, France, 2009)
Thèse examples emphasize the 'major-accident hazard' potential of onshore pipelines. In
most of developed countries, their opération is for that matter under safety régulation and
submitted to external inspection.
But thèse régulation and inspections are not harmonized. As an example, in European
Community, onshore pipelines are excluded from the scope of both the Seveso II Directive
and the Pressure Equipment Directive, although mostof them carry flammable ortoxic
substances at high pressure (from 10 to 80 bars).
In this context, the French national authority in charge of onshore pipelines risks-control
deeply modified régulations in August 2006, for both existing and new pipelines.
In particular it was decided to deal with existing pipelines in urban or suburban areas,
through new risk assessment method and land use planning principles. This paper aims at
presenting and exemplifying this new framework.
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2. The French pipelines network
In France, the characteristics of transmission networks are
• natural pas : 36 500 km long, 30 years old (average),
• crude oil and oil products : 9 900 km long, 44 years old (average),
• other chemical substances : 3 800 km long, 29 years old (average), miscellaneous
substances (ethylene, oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen ...)•
3. A new risk assessment and management method
Every existing pipeline in France shall be subject to a safety study, to be completed before
the 15th of September, 2009. This study has to comply with the 2006 régulation principles: a
guidance document has been developed for that purpose by the French Oil and Chemical
Companies Group for Safety Studies (GESIP). The method (typical semi-quantitative risk
analysis) is divided into several steps, as described in Figure 1.
1. Description (pipeline and environment)
Qualitative
analysis
Quantitative
analysis
Risk control
2. Hazard identification
3. Critical Events (leaks) and dangereous phenomena
Intensity
Risk-reducing
measure5
Probability
5. Risk acceptabilïty ?
Land use Emergency
planning plans
Gravity
1
1
1
1
Local
information
Figure 1: Framework of pipeline safety study (source: GESIP guidance document)
Steps 1 to 4 lead to risk assessment: they are detailed in the next chapter, while risk control
process is explained in chapter 5.
4. Risk assessment: a semi-quantitative analysis with harmonized criteria
4.1 Steps 1 to 3: Qualitative Analysis
Step 1 : Description
Pipeline route and its environment are described in order to collect useful éléments for
further analysis, such as external hazards, human and natural targets in case of an accident.
Step 2: Hazard identification
Hazard identification is mainly based on past accident analyses:
• Company internai database (if expérience is significant),
• National or international databases, such as
- The European Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG),
- the oil companies' association for environment, health and safety in refining
and distribution (CONCAWE).
Some severe accidents are reminded in table 2.
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Table 2: Récent severe accidents on onshore pipelines in Europe, USA and Canada
Date and location
August 10, 1999
Liberty Hill (USA)
July 30, 2004
Ghislenghien (Belgium)
July 24, 2007
Vancouver (Canada)
May 9-10, 2009
Moscow (Russia)
August 7, 2009, Saint-
Martin-de-Crau (France)
Short description
Flash fire and jet fire (50 meters long).
Cause: third party excavation activity
Gas leak, flash fire and jet fire (150 to 200
meters long). Cause: previous third party
excavation activity (dent)
Crude oil leak (234 m3). Cause: third party
excavation activity
Flash fire and jet fire (200 meters long).
Cause: overpressure in the pipeline
Crude oil leak (4000 m3). Cause: unknown
(suspicion of corrosion)
Damage
1 worker missing
24 persons killed, 132
persons injured, buildings
and cars destroyed
Pollution in nearby
houses
5 persons injured
Pollution in a spécial area
of conservation
Hazard identification can be conducted through a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
method, as shown in table 3.
Table 3: Extract ofPHA for current route (source: GESIP guidance document)
Hazard
Over-
pressure
Mecha-
nical
damage
Initiating Event
Line or safety
valve obstruction
Pressure after
pumping too high
Dents, scrapes,
gouges
Cause
Hydrate (if
water)
Impurities
Régulation
failure
Excavator,
drilling machi-
ne, trencher
Consé-
quences
Bridle
leaks
Flange
leaks
Bridle
leaks
Leaks
Détection
measures
Instrumenta-
tion alarm
Instrumenta-
tion alarm
Instrumenta-
tion alarm
Periodic
surveillance
Risk-reducing
measures
Drying / Hygrométrie
controls during
maintenance activities
Filtration / Spécification
check
Pump automatic shut-
down
Valve emergency shut-
down
Step 3: Critical events
Hazard identification (step 2) leads to the définition of critical events. Main critical events for
current route are losses of containment (or leaks). GESIP guidance document defines three
breach sizes:
• small (up to 12 mm diameter), mainly caused by construction or material defect,
corrosion, érosion, lightning boit...,
• médium (up to 70 mm diameter), mainly caused by third party excavation works,
• rupture (line section), mainly caused by ground movements and third party excavation
works (only for gaseous substances under pressure).
Thèse leaks can be followed by several dangerous phenomena, to be detailed in the safety
study. The main phenomena are:
• pollution (for polluting liquids such as oil),
• cloud explosion, jet fire or pool fire in case of ignition (for flammable substances),
• toxic cloud (for toxic substances).
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4.2 Step 4: Quantitative Analysis (risk level)
Qualitative analysis results are used to define the dangerous phenomena. Quantitative
analysis leads to characterize each dangerous phenomenon (from each leak), on each point
of pipeline route, according to three quantitative criteria: intensity, probability and gravity. In
this paragraph ail non-referenced data corne from GESIP guidance document.
1. Intensity
Intensity is defined by three distances (in meters). Each distance is the nearest distance from
the pipeline where référence effects can be observed on population, in case of fire, explosion
or toxic release (cf figure 2).
Nota: Référence effects thresholds on human beings
are defined by régulation:
• SLE (Significantly Lethal Effects or 5%
lethality) - distance D3 ;
• FLE (First Lethal Effects or 1 % lethality) -
distance D2 ;
• IRE (Irréversible Effects) - distance D1.
People can be supposed to escape, after a reaction
time of3 seconds, at the average speed of2.5 meters
per second, if operator can prove lack ofphysical
obstacle.
Figure 2: Effect distances for one phenomenon (iejet fire after a small leak)
Thèse distances are most often calculated by using numerical simulation models of
hazardous phenomena. GESIP guidance document contains a table where generic distances
for vertical jet fires from gas pipelines are given.
If a leak can cause différent phenomena (fire, toxic cloud, overpressure), the worst (with the
biggest effect distances) is chosen for the following analysis.
2. Gravity
For one leak (i.e. médium leak), gravity is defined in each point of the pipeline as the number
of people exposed to leak effects. Population has to be counted in effect circles
• centered in this point (assumed to be the release point),
• with a radius equal to distances D3 (Significantly Lethal Effects or SLE), respectively
D2 (First Lethal Effects or FLE). Irréversible effects (IRE) are not used hère.
Some rules are given for this opération, as for examples consider an average of 2,5 person
in houses, the maximal capacity in public buildings, 0,4 person per km of road and for 100
vehicles per day, 10 persons per 10* m2for open fields ...
3. Probability
In this context probability is defined as the probability (per year) that a point M in the vicinity
of the pipeline can be exposed to an intensity above a given effect level. Probability is
calculated for each référence effect level (respectively SLE and FLE) and for each type of
leak which can happen on any point of the pipeline, as follows:
P(M) = F,eak X Pignition X L X Ii(ECMi X PRFi) X C X Ppres (1 )
where
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P(M) = Probability (point M)
Fieak = Generic frequency of the given leak
Ignition probability (only for flammable substances)
Effect length
Each risk factor leading to the given leak
Efficacy of each risk-reducing measure against the i risk factor
Part of the i risk factor in the given leak
Corrective factor dépendant on pipeline environment
Ppres = Présence rate ofpeople in the vicinity
L is the resuit of géométrie calculation (cf figure 3).
D: effect distance
M
[year1]
[km'1.year1]
[m]
i
ECMi
PRF,
C
(for given leak and effect)
d: distance between point M and pipeline
L: effect length ie length of the section from where the
given phenomenon can reach M with an effect à E
L = 2x(D2-d2)1/2 (2)
The length L is maximal (Lmax = 2D) when M is on the
pipeline.
Figure 3: Calculation of effect length L.
Some parameters in équation (1) are deducted from databases analyses:
• F/eafr is observed between 1970 to 1990. It is estimated between 0.1 and 8
(1O4.km.year)"1 for natural gas and oil pipelines,
• Pignition (if applicable) is estimated between 0,02 and 0,30 (dépendant on substance
and breach size),
• PRFi : for instance 80% of natural gas pipeline ruptures are caused by third party
excavation works, and 20% by ground movements.
ECMI is the risk réduction factor induced by the risk-reducing measure, i.e. its PFD (Probability
of Failure on Demand). C characterises the environment: as an example, suburban areas
(where urbanization is growing) will more likely be submitted to excavation works than open
country. ECMi and C are given in GESIP guidance document (cf tables 4 and 5).
Table 4: Examples of recommended values forECMi
Risk factor: third party excavation works
Risk-reducing Measure
Concrète sleeves + warning tape
Reinforced marking of pipeline
Route surveillance (n times per month)
Periodic information of land owners
EcMi
0,01
0,3
1/n
0,3 to 0,8
Risk factor: corrosion
Risk-reducing Measure
Cathodic protection
Internai inspection (robot)
Scraper
/
EcMi
0,01
0,01
0,3
/
Thèse values can be used if measures comply with GESIP r
Table 5: Recommended values for C (risk factor is third part_
Pipeline environment
Open country
Car park
No ground movements
C
0,8
1
1
Pipeline environment
Suburban or urban area
Closed and built parcel
/
C
3
0,05
/
ecommendations.
y excavation works herej
Depth of cover
0,6 m
0,8 m
1 m
C
2
1
1/3
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Ppres is equal to 1 in first approximation, but can also be detailed (day or night, empty orfull
stadium ...)•
4. Possible simplification of step 4
In order to simplify risk assessment:
• The pipeline can be divided in homogeneous segments, where intensity and
probability are assumed to be uniform.
• Probability inside an effect circle can be assumed to be equal to the maximal one, i.e.
if point M is on the pipeline and L = 2D.
Nevertheless gravity must be calculated or estimated in each point.
5. Risk control (step 5): better protecting exposed population and limit its growth
Step 5 must be conducted ail along the pipeline route.
5.1 Cumulated probability
Results of previous step can be summarized as follows (cf table 6):
Table 6: Results ofstep 4
Leak
Effect distances
(IRE / FLE / SLE)
Probability
Gravity
Small
D1S
/
/
D2S
P2S
G2S
D3S
P3S
G3S
Médium
D1m
/
/
D2m
P2m
G2m
D3m
P3m
G3m
Rupture
D1r
/
/
D2r
P2r
G2r
D3r
P3r
G3r
In table 6, probability to reach a point is distributed between the three breach sizes. Risk
control process is based on "cumulated probability" CP, which is calculated by taking into
account ail leaks. Indeed, if d is the distance between pipeline and human targets:
• If d < D2S : people can be simultaneously impacted by ail the leaks, so
CP2S = P2S + P2m + P2r (3)
• If d < D2m : people can be simultaneously impacted by médium leak and rupture, so
CP2m = P2m + P2r (4)
• If d < D2r : people can be impacted only by rupture, so
CP2r = P2r (5)
The same calculation is done for Significantly Lethal Effects (by replacing 2 with 3 in
équations (3) (4) and (5).
5.2 Risk matrices
Several couples [Probability , Gravity] are then positioned in two risk matrices (cf table 7):
• [ CP2S, G2S ] , [ CP2m , G2m ] and [ CP2r, G2r ] are placed according to the first
column gravity classes (FLE),
• [ CP3S, G3S ] , [ CP3m , G3m ] and [ CP3r, G3r ] are placed according to the second
column gravity classes (SLE).
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Table 7: Risk matrices (source: GESIP guidance document)
Gravity (
FLE
>3000
1000< <3000
300< <1000
100< <300
10< <100
<10
persons)
SLE
>300
100< <300
30< <100
10< <30
1< <10
<1
Probability (year1)
5.10' 10* 5.10* 10D 10^ 10J
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *
* Spécifie building (public buildings, very high buildings and nuclear facilities)
5.3 Risk control process for existing exposed population
Use of risk matrices requires estimation of pipeline safety factor and location category:
• Safety factor is the ratio between internai stress due to Maximum Allowable
Operating Pressure (MAOP) and elastic limit of wall material. Risk is maximal when
this factor is equal to 1. The lower MAOP is, the lower this factor is and pipeline
opération is safer ;
• Location catégories are defined by 2006 régulation, it dépends on several criteria,
such as substance hazards or population density in D3r effect circle. For each location
category a maximal value of the safety factor is given.
Once safety factor and location category are defined, matrices are used to assess risk
acceptabilité, as shown on figure 4.
Nota: If a spécifie
building is placed
in a zone with * in
matrices, at least
one risk-reducing
measure is
required.
Public buildings are
considered as far
as their capacity is
- more than 100
persons for SLE,
- more than 300
persons for FLE.
tion ca
Safety factor £
YES NO
AH accidents in white or grey
zones of risk matrices ?
Ail accidents in white zones
of risk matrices?
Probability
réduction
(factor ECMj )c NO No more risk-reducingmeasures requiredMore risk-reducing measures
required
YES
NO
Figure 4: Risk control process for existing exposed population
5.4 Limitation of exposed population qrowth (land use planning)
Once existing exposed population had been protected as shown on figure 4, operator has to
follow its évolution ail along the pipeline route. For that purpose a Géographie Information
System is required for long pipelines, and every five years the safety study is revised.
If exposed population decreases, nothing is required.
If it increases until location category is modified, operator has to refer to the process on
figure 4 and take appropriate measures if necessary,
Construction or extension of new spécifie buildings (public and very high buildings, nuclear
facilities) is not allowed in effect distances (SLE or FLE) of the small leak in ail cases, and in
effect distances of other leaks if their probability exceeds 10"6 per year.
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5. Conclusion
Since 2006 ail existing hazardous onshore pipelines in France hâve been subjected to a
complète safety analysis, according to harmonized criteria. Use of risk matrices leads to an
homogeneous level of risk exposure ail along the pipeline route.
If population increases in the vicinity of the pipeline, operator has to take risk-reducing
measures until acceptable risk level is reached.
Construction or extension of spécifie buildings (public buildings, very high buildings and
nuclear facilities) is not allowed in effect distances of the small leak in ail cases, and in effect
distances of other leaks if their probability exceeds 10"6 per year.
New pipelines (i.e. commissioned after the 15th of September, 2006) are also subjected to
the same safety analysis, with some spécifie requirements:
• Safety factor has to comply with location catégories,
• AH accidents must be positioned in white zones of risk matrices,
• Pipeline route must avoid existing spécifie buildings (no such buildings in effect
distances of référence leak).
The method gives a harmonized framework for risk management around hazardous pipelines
in France. However it does not solve ail safety issues about pipelines, in particular ageing of
existing networks.
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